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Meeting the buddha on the road – An essay on christian2 scholarship 
This essay looks at the christian theory of science from a very specific 
context. The essay is divided into two parts. In the first part two different 
(christian) theories of science, those of Dooyeweerd and Stoker, will be 
discussed. In the second part, these theories will be analysed against the 
background of recent developments in the theories of science and 
knowledge in the field of law and legal theory. 
The conclusion from the first part is that christian scholarship (and, 
conversely, a christian university) has nothing to do with the morality of 
either students or lecturers. It should also be clear that one cannot speak of 
“the” christian paradigm of science, but that there are various theories and 
paradigms. 
In the second part various problems with these two theories are discussed. 
These include the objectivist stance of both Dooyeweerd and Stoker, 
Dooyeweerd’s archimedean point of departure and Stoker’s use of so-
called scriptural truths. These problems are highlighted by recent 
developments in legal theory of which christian scholarship must take 
cognisance. 
                                           
1 Paper based on a lecture in the series of H.L. Swanepoel commemorative lectures 
delivered at Potchefstroom University during 2000. Thanks to André van der Walt and 
Lourens du Plessis who read an earlier draft and made helpful comments.  
  
2 In some cases I have not followed the normal rules of spelling pertaining to capital 
letters – this is done deliberately in order to demythologise and to indicate the relative 
nature of certain concepts. 
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The conclusion is that, in the first place, there is more than one way in 
which the concept “christian scholarship” can be understood and, in the 
second place, that the label "christian" does not necessarily make such 
theories acceptable. At the very least, two theories dealt with in the article 
are in serious need of updating.  
1. Introduction 
Sheldon Kopp’s book If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him 
(1974), deals with psychoanalysis as a contemporary form of pilgrimage, 
much like the religious and military pilgrimages of old. Kopp’s thesis is 
that people who embark on this type of pilgrimage often look for a guru 
(or buddha) who will provide them with final and liberating answers. 
Wishing to learn, and confusing being taught with learning, they often 
seek out helpers, healers, and guides, spiritual teachers whose 
disciples they would become. … The seeker comes in hope of finding 
something definite, something permanent, something unchanging upon 
which to depend (Kopp, 1974:1, 3). 
This, says Kopp, does not lead to true enlightenment but only produces 
more effective neurotics. Instead, what one should be looking for is a true 
teacher who offers his students something else, that is: 
[T]he reflection that life is just what it seems to be, a changing, 
ambiguous, ephemeral mixed bag. It may often be discouraging, but it 
is ultimately worth it, because that’s all there is (Kopp, 1974:3). 
For this reason anyone or anything setting him-/her-/itself up as a 
buddha, as the source of final answers, should be killed or at least 
avoided.3 
In many ways, scientific or scholarly activity is also a pilgrimage. Of 
course, what this pilgrimage is about has been understood differently in 
different times. Very few scientists these days, for example, still share 
the optimism and belief in science characteristic of nineteenth-century 
thinking (Schlag, 1991:444). Part of the enterprise of science in the 
postmodern era is the exercise of trying to understand exactly what 
science is, how scientific knowledge is formed and verified and what the 
role of theory is in these processes. In many ways, scientists are also 
searching “for something definite, something permanent, something 
unchanging upon which to depend” (Kopp, 1974:3). This search is best 
                                           
3 Kopp (1974:12): “What the guru knows that the seeker does not is that we are all 
pilgrims. There is no master, and there is no student”. 
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reflected in the various theories pertaining to science that have been 
developed. 
This essay examines the “pilgrimage of science” from a very specific 
context. Having spent a large part of my academic life at Potchefstroom 
University, I ingested a particular christian paradigm of science as a 
matter of course. The time has now come to reflect upon this to 
determine its feasibility within the context of postmodern theories or 
paradigms of science and of knowledge within the field of law.  
The question central to this discussion really is whether the theories 
pertaining to scientific practice within a christian paradigm and of the 
“christian university” do not in actual fact constitute the buddha referred 
to above. Do they offer that which does not exist – definite and 
unchanging certainty? To answer this question one needs to look very 
closely at what this kind of theoretical position entails and what it 
produces. 
The concept or notion of a christian university means different things to 
different people. For some, it is an anachronism that harks back to 
medieval ideas and practices. In this view, such a university is regarded 
as outdated at best and parochial at worst. For others, a christian 
university is a haven of conservative values and morality where students 
and/or lecturers can be expected to act in a certain manner. This second 
view is particularly prevalent and equates a christian university with a 
specific code of moral behaviour. It assumes that a university can be 
“christian” in the same way that a person can be. 
Neither of these views needs to be taken very seriously. The first seeks 
to attach a label without engaging with the real question. The second 
represents a view that is not even supported by the theory on which this 
type of university is itself based.4 A better approach would be to assume 
that a christian university needs, as a basic requirement, to be a 
university. This rather obvious statement implies that a christian 
university must be involved in the business of practising science. This in 
turn implies that the term “christian university” can only refer to a 
university that bases its scientific practice on a particular christian 
paradigm directing its work. It is this scientific paradigm that constitutes 
the subject matter of this article. 
                                           
4 I refer here specifically to the idea of sphere sovereignty (or “soewereiniteit in eie 
kring”) that takes as point of departure that a university should not try to do the work of 
another type of societal construct such as, say, a church or a state. 
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To evaluate the particular christian (or reformed) philosophy of science, 
this paper is divided into two parts. In the first part two different (christian) 
views of science will be discussed. The views of Herman Dooyeweerd 
and H.G. Stoker can be regarded as representative of two strands of this 
philosophy and will be briefly discussed.5 In the second part, these 
theories will be analysed against the background of recent developments 
in theory of philosophy of science and knowledge within the field of law 
and legal theory. But, it should be emphasised that “… law is no different 
from any other product of human cognition” (Winter, 1989a:1106; Winter, 
1991:1618). The insights represented here should, therefore, be extra-
polatable to all fields of science. 
2. Models for a christian university 
2.1 H. Dooyeweerd 
Dooyeweerd developed his theory in the early twentieth century with two 
goals in mind. In the first place, he wanted to provide an alternative for 
the rationalism of philosophers like Kant and Descartes (Botha, 1991:55). 
Kant represents the views of what Dooyeweerd calls humanism – the 
view that reason had been freed from religious dependence after the 
Middle Ages (Dooyeweerd, 1948:3; Dooyeweerd, 1953:12).6 For the 
humanists, according to Dooyeweerd, the Middle Ages had been 
characterised by the fact that reason was made subordinate to the 
requirements of faith and the church. The Enlightenment brought an end 
to this – reason was now regarded as autonomous and independent from 
god or religion – man can understand and control the world through 
reason (Dooyeweerd, 1962:32; Dooyeweerd, 1948:9; Dooyeweerd, 
1953:35; Botha, 1991:55).7 
In the second place, Dooyeweerd considered the multitude of philo-
sophies and schools in science as dangerous. It became impossible for 
the various schools to communicate, because there was no common 
ground from which to argue (Dooyeweerd, 1948:1; Dooyeweerd, 1953: 
36-37). This, Dooyeweerd thought, would eventually lead to the de-
struction of western culture (Botha, 1991:55). He therefore wanted to 
                                           
5 Of necessity, the discussion will be brief. Those interested in knowing more about 
these theories are referred to sources quoted. 
6 Dooyeweerd (1948:3) calls humanism the “prejudice about the autonomy of 
theoretical thought”. 
7 Dooyeweerd (1962:32) characterises all scientific views that regard human rationality 
as autonomous as “immanensie” (immanent) philosophies. 
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construct a common ground as a foundation on which communication 
could be effected (Dooyeweerd, 1962:15). 
To achieve these goals, Dooyeweerd suggested the concept of the 
religious ground motif. According to him, all scientists have a basic 
religious view of how reality was created, how it fits together and what its 
purpose is (Dooyeweerd, 1962:22; Klapwijk, 1987:93). This would consti-
tute their religious ground motif, which determines how they view reality 
in their research. These ground motifs can be detected in the theoretical 
concepts they use. What is more, all science investigates aspects of 
reality (for instance law) and all aspects (or modalities) function 
according to laws created by god as part of creation, whether or not 
these scientists recognise and admit this. However, they cannot study 
reality (or an aspect of reality) from within reality – this inevitably leads to 
a distortion of reality (Dooyeweerd, 1962:33; Dooyeweerd, 1948: 9).8 
Reality can only be studied from a vantage point outside reality 
(Dooyeweerd, 1962: 31; Dooyeweerd, 1953:8; Botha, 1991:56), from an 
archimedean point,9 a religious ground motif.10 
In essence then, scientific practice involves the religious ground motif of 
the scientist, who tries to explain how the modalities of reality work by 
means of theoretical concepts (Dooyeweerd, 1962:26; Botha, 1991:57). 
The transcendental standpoint of the scientist (his religious choice) 
together with the modal laws that apply to the specific aspect of reality 
(Dooyeweerd, 1962:30) therefore determine the theory that can be used 
within a specific field of study. The assumption is therefore that reality is 
structured and orderly, and that the scientist can and must explain this 
structure and order. (The subsequent logical assumption is that his own 
explanation of reality in the “Wysbegeerte van die Wetsidee” is the 
correct one (Dooyeweerd, 1948:11 ff.).) That is why proponents of 
various forms of christian scholarship are particularly interested in critical 
                                           
8
 “(Z)e wreekt de verabsolutering door het daarin bevangen teoretische denken in 
innerlijke antinomieën te verstrikken”. 
9 Dooyeweerd (1962:31): “Het (het ware uitgangspunt) zal steeds boven het teoretische 
antithesis moeten verheven zijn, om als centrale betrekkingspunt van de synthesis te 
kunnen fungeren …” See also Dooyeweerd (1953:8): “Only by transcending the 
speciality of meaning can I attain to the actual view of totality …. (this) we call the 
Archimedean point of philosophy”. 
10
 Dooyeweerd (1962:47) states that all philosophies since the start of western 
civilisation can be explained and classified according to their religious ground motif. 
See also Dooyeweerd, 1948:17 ff. and Dooyeweerd, 1953:169-494 where the history 
of philosophy is given on this basis. 
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analysis of the presuppositions11 of specific scientific theories and 
philosophies as they find expression in theoretical concepts. 
For Dooyeweerd, in contrast to Kant, scientific practice is therefore never 
neutral or independent from religion. The religious ground motif is an 
intrinsic part of scientific practice and not merely a later addition. This is 
also what makes a conversation between philosophical schools possible. 
From a scientist’s formulation of theoretical concepts his religious ground 
motif can be abstracted and the defensibility of his theory can be tested. 
2.2 H.G. Stoker 
The Potchefstroom philosopher H.G. Stoker accepted the basic dooye-
weerdian points of departure. He distinguished between pre-scientific 
and scientific knowledge. Pre-scientific knowledge places man in a direct 
and total relationship with everything, but science is about knowledge per 
se (Stoker, 1969:133; Kock, 1973:191). Scientific knowledge is always 
verifiable, systematised and technical-methodological.12 However, accor-
ding to Stoker, this type of knowledge has boundaries determined by, 
among other things, the fact that reality is essentially tainted and 
corrupted by sin. 
According to Stoker, scientific knowledge can be acquired from two 
sources, namely reality (what he calls the cosmos) and the bible (Stoker, 
1969:138). Although the bible cannot and should not be used as a 
scientific textbook, it does contain truths that cannot be deduced from 
reality. God’s revelation in scripture is therefore pre-scientific, but can be 
studied scientifically to enable one to find scriptural truths. These truths 
provide the basis and purpose for the christian paradigm of scholarship 
and is therefore of an absolute nature (Stoker, 1970:61). According to 
Stoker the following are examples of scriptural truths: 
• God is self-sufficient, reality is not. Therefore nothing in reality may be 
regarded as self-sufficient – that would lead to “-isms”.13 
                                           
11 For Dooyeweerd the worldview that contains these presuppositions must be 
distinguished from a Weltanschauung which is nothing more than a subjective view of 
reality and this is, of course, of no use to science. The difference between pre-
scientific and scientific thought lies in the Gegenstand relationship of the latter, which 
is based on analysis and artificial abstraction (Dooyeweerd, 1948:1, 8). 
12 Stoker (1970:56) defines science as: “Soveel moontlik tegnies-metodies gesiste-
matiseerde en soveel moontlik tegnies-metodies geverifieerde kennis van die kenbare 
as sodanig”. See also Stoker, 1969:134-138 and Kock, 1973:192. 
13 For example, the idea that freedom is everything leads to liberalism, or, the idea that 
man is self-sufficient leads to humanism. 
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• God’s law is valid for the whole of reality. This represents a rejection 
of subjectivism.14 
• Reality consists of an essential plurality. 
• Man is created in God’s image. 
• Reality has been radically tainted and corrupted by sin and is there-
fore never inherently good (Stoker, 1970:80; Stoker, 1969:133; Kock, 
1973:193). 
It should, however, be emphasised that the finding of scriptural truths is 
not to be entrusted to “ordinary” scientists. Theologians have to unearth 
these truths which will then be applied in the various scientific 
disciplines.15 
Stoker does not deny that scientific study by different schools can and do 
lead to similar results and findings. Scholarship from a christian 
paradigmatic perspective differs from others because of its insistence on 
the origin, basis, purpose and unity of science (Stoker, 1970:60). The 
fundamental principle at issue here then is the acknowledgement of the 
fundamental importance of religion for science in that it enables the 
scientist to see reality as it really is (Stoker, 1970:60). 
2.3 Summary 
It seems clear from this brief description that “christian scholarship” as 
postulated here (and, conversely, a christian university) has nothing to do 
with the morality of either students or lecturers. It should also be clear 
that one cannot speak of the christian philosophy of science, but that 
there are various theories and philosophies. There are, of course, 
aspects on which most christian philosophers agree. Most agree that 
scientific practice depends on a religious choice exercised by the 
practitioner, and that this choice influences both theory and concepts in 
science. How this influence takes place and where it is located is not, 
however, clear or agreed upon. Both Stoker and Dooyeweerd did, 
however, develop philosophical systems based on these points of 
departure to explain reality. 
                                           
14 In this context subjectivism means that man cannot be regarded as the “measure of 
all things”. 
15 Stoker (1969:142): “Net soos die kenbare in die kosmos tot wetenskap verwerk moet 
word, moet die gegewens van die Heilige Skrif tot wetenskap verwerk word. Dit doen 
die teoloog. … Aan die ander kant mag ’n nie-teoloog hom nie sonder meer op ’n 
Bybelteks beroep nie, en behoort hy hier die hulp van die teoloog in te roep”. (See 
also Stoker, 1970:96.) 
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3. Critical notes 
3.1 Between subjectivism and objectivism 
The history of theories of knowledge is characterised by the conflict 
between objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism involves the view 
that: 
• reality consists of determinate objects that exist independent from 
human rationality and have characteristics independent of human 
determination; 
• these objects can be classified according to natural or inherent 
characteristics or criteria – this is the view known as “foundationalism” 
or “essentialism” (Winter, 1990:651); and 
• rationality deals with statements and principles that accurately 
represent or describe these objects (Winter 1989a:1108; Singer, 
1984:26-29). 
Subjectivism, on the other hand, involves the view that statements, rules 
and categories are simply expressions of a subject’s purposes, feelings 
and religion. Consequently, they are practically infinitely manipulatable 
(Winter, 1989a:1108). It also involves a rejection of the idea that objects 
have essential or natural characteristics. 
Dooyeweerd’s theory of knowledge is based on the idea of objects and 
modalities that exist independently from human thought or interaction. 
They are, after all, part of creation. The way in which the modalities are 
structured and classified is also not the result of human thought, but 
based on the essential nature (called the “sinkern” in Dutch and 
Afrikaans) of the modalities. And, finally, this system is presented as an 
accurate representation of reality. Both Dooyeweerd and Stoker 
therefore rejected subjectivism and it is clear from the above that their 
views fall squarely within the objectivist paradigm. Dooyeweerd’s theory 
is therefore also basically kantian, despite his goal of providing an 
alternative to Kant.16 
One of the problems with this, as with all modernist thinking, is that 
subjectivism and objectivism are believed to be the only two options for 
explaining how knowledge works. Given the choice between “ … the 
                                           
16 Winter (1989a: 1108) quotes Rorty in this regard: “‘Reason’ as the term is used in the 
Platonic and kantian tradition, is interlocked with the notions of truth as 
correspondence, of knowledge as discovery of essence, of morality as obedience to 
principle”. (See also Winter, 1990:651.) 
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belief that meaning has foundations in objective correspondence with the 
world …” or “… that meaning can be nothing more than the arbitrary 
result either of social convention or of unconstrained subjectivity …” 
(Winter, 1989-2:2229), most modernists choose the first option. Dooye-
weerd and Stoker are no exceptions to this “[c]artesian anxiety”17. But 
these are not the only options available.18 As Singer (1984:66) states: 
We are not destined to live in a world in which we must choose between 
believing in some ultimate permanent foundation for law and morality 
(rationalism) or believing that all views are as good as all others and it 
does not matter what we believe or do (nihilism). … When we give up 
the idea that the legal system has a foundation, a “rational basis”, we 
are not left with nothing. We are left with ourselves, and we are not 
nothing.  
Winter has indicated the possibility of an experientialist theory of know-
ledge, (Winter 1989b:2229; Winter, 1989a:1105 ff.; Winter, 1990: 657 ff.) 
and both Winter and Singer deal with other theories such as those 
proposed by Rorty and Bernstein (Singer, 1984: note 8 and accom-
panying text). This does not necessarily mean that these theories would 
provide a better explanation of knowledge and science, but simply that a 
credible christian paradigm must take cognisance of these and other 
theories. In this, as in the case of other texts, the various philosophies 
subscribed to by christian scholars are in line with the claims, arguments 
and discourse of postmodernism (Schlag, 1990:169 note 6). 
3.2 Dooyeweerd and the archimedean point 
Dooyeweerd’s objectivist stance also explains why he had to find a fixed 
point or archimedean point outside reality. If reality is constructed as 
being independent of human rationality and thought, the human act of 
belief must somehow fall outside this reality.  
There are three basic problems with this. In the first place, it assumes 
that reality is structured in such a way that it has an outside and an 
inside. It assumes that reality is something like a container that one can 
climb out of. It is interesting to note that there is a congruence between 
the thinking of Dooyeweerd and Stanley Fish in this regard (Schlag, 
1987:53-58; Winter, 1990:662). 
                                           
17 Winter (1989a:1127) explains that “[c]artesian anxiety” in its starkest form as the 
choice between objectivism and relativism or between foundationalism and nihilism. 
18
 Winter (1989a:1109): “What I want to suggest is that this two-dimensional opposition 
of objectivism and either subjectivism or relativism is an inadequate basis for 
understanding law as a human rational”. 
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But what if one should conceptualise reality differently? Then it becomes 
possible to see theory (and religious ground motifs) as something very 
firmly rooted “in” reality. As Winter (1990:664) states: 
What humans are situated “in” is not some reified entity that looks like a 
box or container. Rather, we are situated in a real physical and social 
environment that is always in flux and always contingent. 
In the second place, even if one accepts the idea of a fixed point outside 
reality, this does not mean that that standpoint is objective or neutral. 
Even if there is a world “out there”, there are no descriptions of that world 
“out there”. Reality looks the way it does because that is how we have 
structured it. This does not necessarily deny that reality was created by 
god, but merely states that what we understand about reality is a result of 
human ideas and prejudices. Even if one believes in modal laws and 
god-made structures, our understanding and explanation of them remain 
human constructs. In our understanding of reality we also construct 
reality. We are both the singer and the song, the player and the cards. 
In the third place, however, it must be stated that it is doubtful whether it 
is possible to have “an [a]rchimedean point outside of some situated, 
historical practice or perspective” (Winter, 1990:645). That also implies 
that there is no transcendental morality that determines human thought 
and action (Winter, 1990:692). “There is no there there until we put there 
there” (Hutchinson, 1985 853). It is impossible for humans to transcend 
reality (as if it were a container we could climb out of).  
3.3 The role of religion 
Within the dooyeweerdian scheme, religion plays a determining role. But 
the importance that Dooyeweerd attaches the role of religion in science 
is probably overstated. Various writers have indicated that things like 
political affiliation, cultural conditioning and gender play as big a role. Of 
course, the point is not that politics or culture or gender somehow directs 
science or subjects “from outside”. Rather, the emphasis is on, for 
instance, law as an “ongoing, socio-cultural construction” (Winter, 1991: 
1607) or the idea that “"law is politics, not because law is subject to 
political value choice, but rather because law is a form that power 
sometimes takes” (Schlag, 1991:448). 
This reality is illustrated by the fact that someone like Stoker could use a 
particular christian philosophy to justify apartheid (in the case of 
universities at any rate) (Stoker, 1970b:209-222). In this case his culturo-
ideological affiliation probably played a much bigger role than his 
religious choices (Van Wyk, 1994:435-454). Or maybe the point is that 
our religious and other views are inextricably interwoven in the sedimen-
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tary layers of our conscience. A credible philosophy of science under-
lying practice of science within a christian paradigm must explain the role 
of not only religion in science, but also of culture, politics, gender and 
education, to name but a few. 
3.4 Stoker and scriptural truths 
One of the biggest problems in a christian philosophy of science is the 
question about the role of the bible in scientific practice. Although Stoker 
is at pains to state that the bible cannot be used as a science textbook 
and even warns against the use of biblical quotes in scientific writing, the 
bible nevertheless plays a big role in his views. But, if scriptural truths 
must guide scientific practice, it is inevitable that the hermeneutic 
question regarding the interpretation of the bible must play a role. Stoker 
solves this problem by leaving the finding of scriptural truths in the safe 
hands of theologians, but this is, in the long run, not satisfactory. There 
are two reasons why the idea of scriptural truths at work in scientific 
practice is ultimately dangerous. 
In the first place, one should remember that everything is interpretation. 
Interpretation of the Bible does not imply some kind of divine inter-
vention, but is as dependent on personal convictions as the interpretation 
of other texts. To illustrate this the views of two christian scholars 
regarding human rights will be discussed. 
Johan van der Vyver’s view of human rights is one of the first truly South 
African theories on this important subject. He based his views on an 
explicitly dooyeweerdian point of departure – according to him human 
rights are part of the structural principles built into creation by god.19 This 
implies that the state must include these structural principles in 
legislation. For him a bill of human rights is therefore not the result of a 
social contract (as is the case with Locke) or subject to the will of the 
legislature (as is the case with Hobbes), but a necessary part of the 
structure of creation (derived from Dooyeweerd) (Van der Vyver, 1984: 
12-14). 
For Francois Venter this is (was?) not acceptable. For him human rights 
cannot be squared with a calvinist view on law, authority and the state 
(Venter, 1984:13-14). He bases his view on scriptural truths about the 
non-threatening nature of state power (based in turn on Romans 13:3-
                                           
19 Van der Vyver (1975:17): “God het met die skepping in beginsel menseregte voorsien 
… die regsvormende orgaan (is) in dié verband aan onveranderlike struktuurbeginsels 
gebonde …”. 
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420) and the fact that the theory of human rights is derived from 
humanism21 which makes it unacceptable for traditional christian 
thinkers. He is also opposed to the non-christian concept of freedom 
which, according to him, forms the basis of the theory of human rights. 
Therefore he argues that the virility of the “radical reformational thinking” 
must not be disregarded by “calvinising” “ideas foreign to scripture”, but 
that the “depth and breadth of the bible must be studied” to get to the 
correct concepts.22 
In reaction to this, there are two temptations. The first is to react in typical 
objectivist fashion that “if people do not agree, someone is thinking 
incorrectly” (Singer, 1984:34). This would be an acceptable reaction 
within objectivist christian philosophies of science – if there are differen-
ces, it must be because the wrong scriptural truths were used!  
But this denies the very real role played by interpretation. The second 
temptation is therefore to typify Van der Vyver’s view as dooyeweerdian 
and Venter’s view as stokerian or to excuse Venter’s view as a product of 
its time, but that is not the important point. The purpose of the 
comparison is to indicate that the use of a reformational or christian 
approach by different scholars does not necessarily guarantee the same 
interpretation of “scriptural truths”. 
The second reason for scepticism about scriptural truths has to do with 
the feminist critique of the bible itself and with dogmatic interpretations of 
this text. There is no doubt that both the Old and New Testament must 
be understood within the context of the patriarchal system operational at 
the time of their writing and that the religion based on such views is 
deeply sexist and patriarchal (Dowell & Hurcombe, 1981:67; Ruether, 
1983:19). This sexism is part and parcel of both calvinism and the 
Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea in the form of the idea of the created 
social order (an idea found in the views of both Van der Vyver and 
Venter). As Ruether (1983:98) states: 
In Calvinism, women not only were but are equivalent with men in the 
image of God. In their essential nature, women have as much capacity 
for conscience and spiritual things as do men. The subordination of 
                                           
20 Venter (1984:13): “Hierop moet ten minste twee stukke kommentaar gelewer word: 
eerstens die feit dat owerheidsgesag in beginsel geen bedreiging vir die burger inhou 
nie …”. 
21 For Venter (1984:13) individualism, liberalism and rationalism are all examples of 
humanism, because they support an emphasis on humanity. 
22 Venter (1984:13). All quotes translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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women to men is not an expression of an inferiority either in nature or in 
fallen history. Rather, it reflects the divinely created social order by 
which God has ordained the rule of some and the subjugation of others: 
rulers over subjects, masters over servants, husbands over wives, 
parents over children. This hierarchical order is not a reflection of 
differences of human nature, but rather of differences of appointed 
social office. The man rules not because he is superior but because 
God has commanded him to do so. 
The point therefore is that the identification of scriptural truths is always a 
process of election – one in which some truths are more true than others. 
And this choice is at least partly determined by the social situatedness of 
the interpreter. All female and/or feminist christian scholars should be 
very worried about sexist assumptions that are regarded as scriptural 
truths. 
4. Conclusion 
Can we actually ‘know’ the universe? My God, it’s hard enough finding 
your way around Chinatown (Allen, 1978:28). 
The purpose of this essay was not to provide an alternative philosophy or 
to canvass all christian views or philosophies of science. The purpose 
was more modest: it was an attempt to offer a critical analysis of theories 
often used and quoted indiscriminately. From this analysis a number of 
conclusions can be drawn about theories of science generally. These 
conclusions are discussed below. 
In the first place it should be clear that the popularly-described concept 
“christian scholarship” can be understood in more than one way and that, 
in the second place, the label “christian” does not necessarily make the 
theories acceptable. As Singer (1984:36) states: “Even if those theories 
determine results, what makes [them] legitimate?”  
In more general terms at least three conclusions can be reached 
regarding theories of science in general.  
• In the first place the objectivist/subjectivist dichotomy is outdated and 
must be rejected. The rejection is based on the insight that science, 
truth and theory are all human products or constructs (Winter, 1991: 
1601). This is not a claim for subjectivism, but a claim that our 
understanding of the world and of science is not “… a pregiven, static 
configuration of power, but rather … an ongoing socio-cultural 
construction” (Winter, 1991:1607). A credible christian philosophy of 
science within the christian paradigm needs to take cognisance of 
this. 
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• In the second place the essentialist claim that objects have absolute 
meaning and characteristics must also be rejected. This insight goes 
to the heart of one particular strand of christian philosophy of science 
and it is even doubtful whether such a philosophy can survive without 
the essentialist pretensions of absolute categories (modalities) and 
characteristics (“sinkern”). But contemporary thinking on this implies 
that, in the first place, the role of theory is not to “… end all 
modulations with a determinate formula to govern practice” (Winter, 
1990:657). The role of theory is rather to explore the “magic chasm” of 
possibility to enable more considered action, and it also implies that 
we can no longer abdicate our responsibility for our actions. It is easy 
to accept the world (and science) as it is, if you can claim that that is 
simply how it has been created. But we can no longer blame the 
choices we make (in law, in science and in life) on some truth “out 
there” as if our choices are compelled by some transcendent morality. 
As Singer states: “We will have to take responsibility for making up 
our minds” (Singer, 1984: 6). 
• In the third place the sexist basis and implications of certain traditional 
christian philosophies of science should not be ignored. As with 
everything in life, it has consequences for how the world will be seen 
and will be. If women are seen as naturally subordinate to men, 
because that is part of the created “social order”, this thinking will 
necessarily be reflected in how the position of women is seen in law 
and in other spheres of life. It will also be reflected in how female 
scientists are treated by a university postulated on this world view and 
paradigm of science. Theories are not without consequences – they 
affect how we live and what we do. 
It is time to kill the buddha. How we live and what we do, is up to us. 
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